Document Type : Science - Research (Islamic Finance Jurisprudence)
Authors
1 Professor, Department of Jurisprudence & the Essentials of the Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 PhD student in Jurisprudence & the Essentials of the Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran, and visiting lecturer at Bozorgmehr University
Abstract
1. Introduction and Objective
The modern banking system, as a cornerstone of the capitalist economy, functions primarily on the principle of interest-based financial intermediation. Through accepting deposits and extending loans, banks mobilize idle funds, convert them into productive capital, and stimulate economic growth. This financial mechanism—though economically efficient—raises profound jurisprudential and ethical concerns when examined through the lens of Islamic law (fiqh al-muʿāmalāt), where the payment or receipt of interest is often equated with ribā (usury).
In the Islamic worldview, ribā represents one of the gravest transgressions against divine economic justice. The Qur’an explicitly condemns it—“O you who believe, fear Allah and give up what remains of usury if you are believers” (al-Baqara, 2:278)—and classical jurists have enumerated its prohibition as one of the fundamental necessities (ḍarūriyyāt) of the faith. Despite this textual clarity, the integration of modern banking practices into Islamic economies has reignited debates concerning whether ribā applies universally to all forms of financial increase (ziyādah) or whether certain institutional contexts, such as state-owned banking, fall outside its scope.
This study specifically addresses the critical question: Does the Qur’anic and jurisprudential prohibition of ribā apply exclusively to financial relationships between natural persons, or does it also encompass transactions between banks (as legal entities) and their clients, including state or public financial institutions?
The research explores this question through the lens of Shahid Murtaza Motahhari’s interpretive approach, which attempts to reconcile the economic realities of modern banking with the ethical imperatives of Islamic jurisprudence. Motahhari proposed that ribā derived from state-owned banking operations may not fall under the Qur’anic prohibition, as the profit generated is ultimately reinvested in the collective welfare of society. This perspective represents a significant jurisprudential deviation from the classical position, which deems all forms of ribā al-qarḍ (usurious loan contracts) categorically impermissible.
The objective of this research is therefore twofold:
(1) to systematically examine the theoretical and textual foundations of Motahhari’s reasoning regarding the permissibility of state bank interest; and
(2) to evaluate the jurisprudential validity of his argument through an analytical study of Qur’anic evidence, Prophetic traditions, and the principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory).
2. Methods and Materials
The research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology, combining textual exegesis, comparative jurisprudence, and analytical reasoning. The methodological framework involves three primary components:
Textual Analysis of Foundational Sources:
The study draws upon Qur’anic verses (especially al-Baqara 275–279 and Āl ʿImrān 130), ḥadīth literature, and the exegetical interpretations of classical jurists such as al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, al-Shahīd al-Thānī, al-Khūʾī, and others. The goal is to determine the linguistic and contextual scope (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ) of the term ribā and assess whether the prohibition can be limited to particular agents or contexts.
Analytical Evaluation of Jurisprudential Positions:
The arguments of contemporary and premodern jurists are systematically reviewed, focusing on three interpretive dimensions:
(a) whether the prohibition of ribā extends to legal persons (banks, states, institutions);
(b) whether public welfare (maṣlaḥa ʿāmma) can constitute a valid justification for exceptions; and
(c) whether ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyya (removal of specific contextual limitations) can legitimately exempt banking interest from the general ruling of prohibition.
Critical Appraisal of Motahhari’s Theory:
Motahhari’s twofold reasoning—(i) the restriction of ribā to private capital and (ii) the removal of specificity (ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyya) from established exemptions—is subjected to a critical analysis based on the principles of uṣūl al-fiqh. His argument is contrasted with the prevailing consensus (ijmāʿ) of Shi‘i and Sunni scholars to assess its coherence, consistency, and textual grounding.
The study relies entirely on library-based research, using classical Arabic and Persian legal sources, as well as modern economic and banking literature, to bridge jurisprudential theory and financial practice. The analysis emphasizes objectivity, textual authenticity, and methodological transparency to ensure reproducibility and scholarly rigor.
3. Research Findings
The investigation reveals that Shahid Motahhari’s theory rests on two principal claims:
(1) Restriction of Ribā to Private Capital: Motahhari argues that the ʿilla (effective cause) of ribā lies in the exploitation inherent in private usurious transactions, wherein one individual unjustly profits from another’s financial hardship. In contrast, he suggests that when the lender is the state or a public institution, the revenue obtained from interest-bearing loans returns to society through redistribution mechanisms such as public spending, infrastructure development, and welfare programs. Consequently, the element of injustice (ẓulm)—which he interprets as the underlying rationale of the prohibition—is absent in this context.
(2) Application of Ilghāʾ al-Khuṣūṣiyya (Removal of Specificity): Motahhari further argues that the specific exemptions to ribā recognized in classical jurisprudence—such as transactions between a father and son, husband and wife, or Muslim and kāfir ḥarbī—demonstrate the elasticity of the prohibition in contexts where exploitation is absent. By extending the same reasoning through ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyya, he posits that bank interest, particularly in state-run institutions, may also be exempted from prohibition, as it serves the public good and does not contravene the moral spirit of the Qur’anic injunction.
However, the analytical examination conducted in this study challenges both foundations of Motahhari’s reasoning. First, limiting ribā to private capital lacks explicit textual support; the Qur’anic verses prohibiting ribā are expressed in absolute terms and do not distinguish between private and collective entities. Second, ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyya—to be valid in uṣūl al-fiqh—must be grounded in ʿurf (customary understanding) and a clear conceptual congruence between the cause and the ruling (tanāsub al-ḥukm wa-l-mawḍūʿ). Motahhari’s application of this principle, however, relies primarily on subjective reasoning (istihsān) rather than a demonstrable linguistic or juristic equivalence.
Furthermore, the study identifies no valid qarīna (corroborating indication) in either scriptural or rational sources to suggest that charging interest by state banks qualifies as a maṣlaḥa ʿāmma (public welfare) exception. On the contrary, most contemporary jurists—both in the Shīʿī and Sunnī traditions—affirm the universal applicability of ribā’s prohibition, irrespective of the borrower’s or lender’s legal personality.
Accordingly, the findings support the classical position that the essence of ribā (ziyāda bilā ʿiwaḍ, “increase without equivalent exchange”) determines its illegality, not the identity of the contracting parties. Thus, the interest-based transactions of both private and public banks fall within the scope of the Qur’anic prohibition.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis leads to several significant jurisprudential conclusions:
(1) Universality of the Prohibition: The Qur’anic injunction against ribā—expressed in verses such as “Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury” (al-Baqara 2:275) and “Allah obliterates usury and nourishes charities” (2:276)—is comprehensive and absolute. It encompasses every form of financial increase unaccompanied by real economic exchange, without differentiating between individuals, corporations, or state entities. The textual ʿumūm (generality) of these verses nullifies attempts to restrict the ruling to private transactions.
(2) Irrelevance of Legal Personality: From a jurisprudential standpoint, legal personality (shakhṣiyyat ḥuqūqiyya) does not alter the nature of a contractual act. A loan contract (ʿaqd al-qarḍ) remains identical in its legal essence whether executed by a private individual or a public institution. Hence, if an increase (ziyādah) is stipulated as a condition for repayment, it constitutes ribā al-qarḍ regardless of the lender’s identity.
(3) Inadmissibility of Welfare-Based Exceptions: Arguments appealing to public interest or economic necessity cannot override an explicit Qur’anic prohibition unless supported by decisive evidence. The claim that bank interest serves collective welfare lacks empirical substantiation and fails the juristic test of maṣlaḥa muʿtabara—a recognized, textually grounded public interest.
(4) Invalidity of Ilghāʾ al-Khuṣūṣiyya as Applied by Motahhari: The principle of removing specificity can only operate where a rational or customary parity exists between the stated and proposed cases. Motahhari’s analogy between intra-familial ribā exemptions and state-bank transactions lacks such parity and therefore does not meet the criteria of legitimate ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyya.
(5) Consequent Jurisprudential Implication: Based on the above reasoning, bank interest—whether in private, public, or governmental institutions—constitutes a prohibited form of ribā al-qarḍ. Any claim of permissibility would require new, explicit textual or juristic authorization, which is currently absent in both Sunni and Shīʿī legal corpora.
In conclusion, this research reaffirms the universality and immutability of the Qur’anic prohibition of ribā. Attempts to justify interest-based banking within Islamic jurisprudence through analogical reasoning or welfare-based exceptions remain methodologically and textually unsound. Consequently, Islamic finance frameworks must seek alternative, non-usurious models—such as profit–loss sharing, partnership contracts (mushārakah, muḍārabah), and asset-backed transactions (murābaḥah, ijārah)—to ensure conformity with both the letter and spirit of Islamic law.
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